The international economic situation, once the definitive 2023 figures are known, is characterized by the continuation of the overall slowdown in the growth. The GDP is remaining around 3% in the interannual increase rate, but it is still incapable of recovering the growth levels reached immediately after the confinement, whereas it is sustaining the already assessed trend for the years prior 2020.
The 2024 and 2025 forecasts are still below the historical mean of interannual GDP increases (3.8%, between 2000 and 2019). This situation is affecting unequally the different regions of the globe. The slowdown in the so-called “advanced economies” is more conspicuous —their growth is around 1%— than in the “emerging economies” —whose growth rate is around 4%—; all of them are still quite far away from the figures reached at the beginning of the previous decade.
The international capitalist agencies are basing their 2024-2025 forecasts of economic growth on several hypothesis such as price drops in raw materials and fuels, caused by a more or less full recovery of supply chains and the lowering of inflation worldwide attributed to the policies of increase in interest rates carried out in the last two years.
Nevertheless, the situation of the world and the trends being developed are making these hypotheses really weak. Even though it is no longer a daily news, the situation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is still similar to what we stated in the previous plenary session. Freight prices have skyrocketed (150%-200% at the beginning of the year). Costs and delivery times have also increased because a large part of maritime traffic has been diverted to the Cape of Good Hope.
Furthermore, it is not possible to ensure a price drop in raw materials based only on the decrease of inflation rates, as there are other relevant factors affecting the fixation of prices, such as the speculation in the so-called commodity markets or, more important, the results of the inter-imperialist rivalries. For example, the interannual increase of the price of the Brent crude oil —OPEP— is more than 7%, largely due to the tensions in the area after the outbreak of the war of Israel against Palestine.
In this sense, it should be taken into account that, apart from traditional raw materials, there are the so-called “rare earth” materials. They have a huge relevance in the maintenance of the production of strategic sectors such as the car and pharmaceutical industries. Out of the 51 “strategic raw materials” established by the EU for the maintenance of key industries and sectors as well as the ensuring of the so-called “strategic autonomy”, China is the main supplier of 34, the rest of the BRICS are the main suppliers of another 7, Turkey supplies 2, and the D.R. Of Congo supplies 2. This fact turns out to be highly relevant. As of supplies for the EU, China is the main supplier of 24 strategic raw materials, while the rest of the BRICS supplies 3, just like Turkey, and other countries like Morocco (phosphates, although a relevant part of it belongs to Western Sahara), Kazakhstan (phosphorus and titanium) or Qatar (helium) also come into play. It is important to bear in mind that China supplies 100% of the so-called “heavy rare earth elements” (mainly used for electronics and medical equipment) and 85% of “light rare earth elements” (mainly used for cars and telecommunications), in both the world and European levels. Meanwhile, South Africa supplies 75% of platinum-group metals (for cars and pharmaceutical industries) in the world, and Russia supplies 40% of palladium (fuel cells). All of this helps to understand not only the strong dependence —particularly the EU’s— towards other powers, but also to know where the strategic lines of the international politics of the bloc will be going through.
Therefore, the main risks for the world capitalist economic growth are to be found in the very capitalist contradictions. What the bourgeois analysts call “geopolitical risks” are nothing but imperialist rivalries, in which every power or bloc pays attention to its own strategic interests, which in this moment is not the overall opening of trade and investments, but rather the contrary. The figures of world economic growth are interesting from a descriptive viewpoint as one of the expressions of the general pace of world capitalism, but the concern of capitalists is their own and their allies’ situation, not the general pace, even though world capitalism is still largely based on inter-dependence.
In this context, the immediate forecasts regarding international trade are also below the historic figures (4.9%). The noticeable increase of protectionism —perfectly illustrated by the fact that around 6,000 trade restrictions between countries were imposed in 2022 and 2023, whereas there were only more than 1,000 in 2019— earns a special interest. This trend is being developed since 2018 and relies on two arguments: the shortening of supply chains —highly volatile— and the promotion of digitalization and “green” industries which, in the case of Europe, has a strong component of protection for their domestic monopolies.
Besides, the expense in weaponry keeps its continuous growth. In Spain, it represented around 0.93% of the GDP in 2018, 1.23% in 2023, and it is foreseen to reach 1.3% in 2024 and 2% in 2029, as it is agreed within the NATO. Overall, several NATO countries will reach 2% this year. Estimations state that the joint expenses in defense of the European countries will reach 2%. The closest countries to Russia —headed by Poland— are those leading the expense in proportion to their GDP. The world military expense in 2023 was 9% higher than the previous year. In 2022, the European NATO member countries’ military expense was 30% higher than 2013. Europe almost doubled —94%— in 2019-2023 the acquisition of weapons as of 2014-2018.
The recent news about the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), established in 2011 aiming to ensure the financial stability of the Eurozone, giving more than 400 billions of euros out to the EU countries in order to fund the defense industry and the “green transition” is really significant, and it is directly connected to initiatives like the creation of the Mechanism of Capital regarding Defense (by the European Commission and the European Fund of Investments) as well as the statements made in the last months by the different political authorities of the continent regarding the need of rearming and the adoption of an openly warmongering stance against Russia. The Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, even stated by the end of March that “we are in a pre-war era”. The European Commissioner, Thierry Breton, stated in early April that “we need to change the paradigm and move into war economy mode”. Also in March, the French President, Macron, suggested the deployment of troops in Ukraine, arguing that a Russian victory in that country would become “an existential conflict for Europe and for France”.
The verbal escalation of a significant part of European leaders —the Russian band has not lagged behind in it, threatening with nuclear attacks in case of an European or NATO intervention in Ukraine— has come along with the announcements of plans for the recovery or enlargement of the military service in countries like Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands or Germany or for calling reservists in Belgium. We had never known a situation with these features in recent history.
The hotspots already assessed in other reports, like the situation in Taiwan —which can unleash an open conflict between the USA and China—, the situation in Palestine —where the genocide has not stopped and the dimensions of the humanitarian catastrophe had never not been witnessed in decades— are to be added to this situation. Apart from the indiscriminate attacks against the Palestinian population and the difficulties to deliver the “assistance” sent by the same powers that are arming the State of Israel, the attempts of Israel to provoke the entry in the war of countries like Iran are eye-catching.
The attack against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, in which several high-ranked Iranian military leaders died, was responded with the launch of missiles and drones against Israel in the night of April 13th. Although everything points out to a dramatization to diplomatically satisfy Iran after the bombing of a consular headquarters in a third country —as there were limited options to cause damage on Israeli land—, it is the first time Iran makes a direct attack against Israel. The escalation is evident, and new Israeli provocations or the imposing of new sanctions against Tehran by the powers allied to Israel cannot be discarded. The continuation of the exchange of attacks and gestures between both countries, which can create even more dangerous situations than the ones we know up to date, can neither be discarded.
It should be taken into account, in this sense, that the confrontation between Israel and Iran goes far beyond the Palestinian case. It is true that Tehran is the main ally of Hamas and Hezbollah, but it is also one of the few regional powers that has not started any process to approach Israel until now, differently to what other countries like Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Qatar, Bahrain, or the United Arab Emirates have done, largely under the auspices of the US diplomacy. For the Western imperialist powers, Iran is the enemy power in the area, also allied with other powers like Russia and China. The Israeli provocations seem therefore to obey to the will of intensifying the clash in a very important geostrategic area (Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East) for all the powers.
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The situation portrayed by these figures is an economic slowdown along with a growing protectionism, a greater instability, and an increasingly more aggressive warmongering rhetoric. There is no doubt this is an explosive cocktail in which developments like the terrible terrorist attack in Moscow can be used as an argument for the increase of the confrontation and the legitimization of new aggressions by any of the actors involved. It is really difficult, in these moments, to clearly see and know who is the benefited part in each terrorist attack, as all the powers are using them to attempt to reinforce their speech, as it happens in war moments. This is precisely the most dangerous issue for the population of all the countries in these moments.
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It should be taken into account that the calls on rearming, the growth of the military and defense expenses, and eventually the preparation for war have consequences for the life and labor conditions of the class. Although the “war economy mode” is not by itself a war economy, it should be taken into account that the State machinery is going to allocate increasingly more resources to the sectors bonded to the war industry. The European funds resulting from the pandemic, in their different versions, can be easily redirected to projects related to rearming. Linking them to the digitalization, the relevance of certain strategic sectors and the ever-present strategic autonomy with the military industry is enough. Actually, this is being already made in several projects —those connected to the company Indra, for instance— and promoted thanks to the argument of the creation of employment.
Particularly on this subject, we have to be quite aware that the preparation for war encompasses all kind of maneuvers and arguments which the disciplining of the working class and the ensemble of the population is sought with, as well as the more or less direct acceptance of the warmongering politics. One of the most powerful arguments in this sense is the subject of employment and/or the circumstantial improvement of certain features of labor conditions in certain sectors. Actually, it is being already used by some trade-union instances as an argument to not expose the involvement of Spain in NATO or to promote the abstract pacifist stances of bourgeois pacifism.
This means the need to prepare really well the ideological struggle in the ground where the immediate interests of the class are going to be clashed in practice with the mid-term and long-term interests of the ensemble of the class, thus legitimizing in the way the participation in imperialist alliances. Our role in this situation and this stage is not applying a thick line, and much less demanding for the closure of industrial sectors connected to the war economy, but the following:
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Exposing the general policies with a warmongering guidance being adopted by the Spanish State apparatus as an element that attacks the general interests of the class;
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Demanding the stoppage of all the projects with a military nature and their redirection towards projects with a civil nature connected to the improvement in the life conditions of the class;
These are two features that should always go together and cannot be separated in the intervention of the Party. They should be necessarily accompanied by a suitable planning and information, with a communicative strategy drafted in a propositional sense, i.e. the goal is to formulate that the development of projects connected to the improvement in the life conditions of the population and not to the preparation for war is possible, but in order to do so it is necessary to break with the warmongering policies and the participation in alliances such as NATO.
The economic and political situation in Spain
It is especially interesting to assess the data of the Spanish economy, as its growth rates in the last year have been remarkably higher than the ones from other European powers (2.5%, whereas France was 0.8%, Italy was 0.7%, and Germany was -0.3%).
According to different bourgeois analysts, this growth is the result of several factors, among which the following are quoted: growth in the exports of goods and services, connected to a higher competitiveness of Spanish companies, along with high levels of foreign tourism and a high public expense, to which the growth in consumption in households —though it may seem a counter-intuitive fact due to the level of inflation and caused mainly by a lesser savings rate— could be added.
What does that actually mean? Spanish companies are more competitive while trading abroad to a large extent because of the processes of inner devaluation displayed since the 2008 crisis and, more recently, the adaptation of the model of labor hiring to the adequacy to productive needs, by applying the scheme of flexicurity. Nevertheless, this does not make the companies immune to the risks caused by the problems in the supply chains and the protectionist trends.
On the other side, Spain was the 2nd country in the world by reception of foreign tourists in 2023, with a 18.85% growth as of the previous year — more than 85 millions of international tourists, the highest figure up to date. Considering that more than 45% of such tourists arrive from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, the effect of the process of international division of labor, which we have repeatedly exposed, is seen quite clearly. Almost 13% of Spanish GDP corresponds to everything related to tourism. Furthermore, it should be taken into account the effects this bet has in other aspects of the economic and labor life of the country. For example, it is possible to partially attribute to the touristification the increase in the price of a house, caused by the growing commodification of the housing stock via the entry of relevant amounts of capital allocated to the utilization of the housing demand. Apart from this, it has an effect as of the needs of workforce. Together, hostelry and commerce would take the 2nd place in the creation of employments in 2023. It should be taken into consideration these are sectors in which labor conditions have been historically worse. Precariousness, underemployment, and temporariness are the general rule in them.
The public expense has also had a remarkable impact and can explain some features regarding the competitiveness of companies and inner consumption, taking into account that numerous direct and indirect contributions to companies and households have been made by both the decrease of taxes and the assistance to consumption, which have been maintained in 2023, but could be noticeably reduced in 2024, when the Pact of Stability could be applied again.
The factors explaining the “smooth functioning” of the Spanish economy are therefore connected to the general risks we have seen before. The relative improvement regarding the other EU economies or the Eurozone obeys to circumstantial factors that also have to do with the impact in the Central European countries caused by the war in Ukraine. Taking into account, for example, that more than two thirds of the Spanish exports are sent to other EU countries, the problems in those countries will eventually have an effect on the Spanish economy. The redirection of public expense towards the defense sector and the functioning of inflation will have an effect not only in the macroeconomic data, but also —and above all— in the life conditions of the working-class majority.
It has been stated that the figures regarding employment have to do with the upturn in inner consumption as well. These figures are interesting for several reasons. First, temporary hiring stays ahead, as more than a half of the contracts signed between January and February in this year were temporary. Second, the “pure” indefinite contracts have been slightly surpassed by seasonal-permanent and part-time indefinite ones. Third, taking into account the figures of the Labor Force Survey, 70% of the “employments created” since 2021 have been made for foreign workers, mainly in jobs with a low qualification and the sectors with worse overall labor conditions (hostelry, commerce). The origin of these workers is mainly Morocco, Colombia, and Venezuela. These figures lead to some reflections. First, the discussion on the employment is mainly attached to the usefulness of hiring formulas for the capitalists, their ease to be connected to productive cycles, and not to aspects like the amount of the minimum wage. Second, foreign workforce is not “steeling” jobs, but it is rather used by capitalists according to their needs in each moment. Third, the campaigns devoted to the criminalization of foreign population are headed to the promotion of a larger division within the class, thus averting the possibility to make bonds between native and migrant workers. Something similar is happening with female work, with certain sectors promoting campaigns addressing to the reduction of the role of women in the labor sphere. Our advocacy of the work with these sections of the class makes more sense under such conditions.
It is also worth mentioning here that the temporary coincidence of the approval of the so-called “new pact on migration and asylum” in the European Parliament —with the support of the PSOE and the PP— and the almost unanimous acceptance of the parliamentary process of the popular legislative initiative (ILP) requesting the extraordinary regularization of immigrants in Spain, supported by all the parties but VOX. The “new European pact” hardens the European migratory policy and has received strong criticism for that. Therefore, at first sight, the admission of the process of the ILP can be assessed as a way to shut up some of this criticism in Spain. The reality, however, is a bit more complex.
First, because the two developments are approaching different sides of the migratory question — one approaches the border policy (the future immigration) and the other a reality that already exists in Spain. Periodically, there were extraordinary regularizations in Spain, generally when there were periods of economic expansion, when the State authorities are interested in causing the emergence of sections of informal economy. From a strategic prospect, the employers are interested in having more “legal” foreign manpower, not only by the downgrade they could make in wages or the occupation of several less requested posts, but also because it is a workforce that can be highly adaptable to their needs, as it is, by definition, mobile and returnable.
Thus, the strictest border policy and the policy of extraordinary regularizations are, from the point of view of capitalists and their managers, two compatible elements, because one aims at a larger control of migratory flows (not their stoppage) while the other aims at taking advantage of them once they have happened. The moral or humanitarian considerations —which generally serve to legitimize the decisions made— occupy a secondary position. However, the class considerations have a key relevance for us, as they come from an objective fact —the relation of each worker with productive means, regardless of their origin. This forces us to decisively work towards those sections, as we have stated before.
In this framework, the Spanish Government is trying to show off because of the economic data, but the political situation is focused in other elements. On one side, corruption is having relevance, mainly due to the case Koldo, the case Ayuso, and other cases like the one affecting Pedro Sánchez’s wife and her relation with several companies that were assisted by the Government. On the other side, the question of the amnesty and the results of the formation of the second edition of the government of social democratic coalition with the support of all the independentist forces. More recently, the memorialistic question has gained some media relevance with the announcement of the Government to take some of the “laws on concord” adopted by several PP and VOX autonomic governments to the Constitutional Court. Within this framework, three electoral processes are taking place — the autonomic elections in the Basque Country and Catalonia in April and May as well as the European elections in June.
Regarding the corruption cases, our approach should get away from any moralist bias. Our standpoint cannot be understood under any concept as a legitimization of the idea —advocated by some sections of the new social democracy— that there are “clean” ways of capitalist management. On the contrary, we must be very clear when connecting these corruption cases we are knowing with a series of features intrinsic to the very capitalist development. Among such features, we can emphasize right now some of them, although we should keep on deepening in the subject:
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the ability of the State to establish mechanisms enabling the profitability of companies;
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the growing trend to understand public services as services that are “essential for the general interest” but can be provided by private companies funded by the State to do so;
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the huge amounts of money allocated in public budgets for various acquisitions, projects, and programs executed by or hired to private companies;
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the growth of lobbies, created not only in order to favor the adoption of certain types of rules, but also to gain advantages in public contracting.
The State apparatus is still the management committee of the bourgeoisie, even though it is disguised with an apparent neutrality. Every government, at the different levels of the State apparatus, from the municipality, is plunged into the same dynamics. At best, actors can change, but the functioning remains the same. In this sense, when the main parliamentary parties blame to the other ones for their corruption cases, when they hoist the “you do it more than I do” we are witnessing in these months, they are doing nothing but acknowledging their deep attachment to entrepreneurial sections and how easy can public funds be used to favor them. This is therefore a matter inherent to the very dynamics and needs of capitalist accumulation. The individual or collective responsibility of individuals or parties is just the weak link of the chain, an expendable link when this kind of acts are openly known. The different corruption cases being known, though still few, uncover that such alleged State neutrality does not exist. They also let us see that the bourgeois class is maintaining their particular struggle for their own profit by using all the springs at their reach.
The autonomic elections mean an evident risk for the government of coalition. Not the Basque elections, in which the fight between the PNV and EH Bildu will be solved by the Basque section of the PSOE, while the different independentist forces have already guaranteed their support to the Government regardless of the result. On the contrary, the Catalan elections are a risk, as the ability of Junts to block the congress is key, and all the possibilities are open according to the electoral results and the alliances that necessarily can be formed in order to ensure the governance of the Generalitat. The first result of the Catalan electoral process was the withdrawal of the project of the 2024 State General Budget, as the impossibility to make agreements in time for their processing was evident. This was seen as an evidence of the extreme weakness of the government, whose bloc has been also affected by the entry of José Luis Ábalos to the mixed group of the parliament because of the case Koldo. The recent adoption in the Congress of the so-called Law on Amnesty — which we have already assessed as the confirmation of the defeat of independentism and as a result of the weakness of the Central Government and its need to bind the support of ERC and Junts— will have a stormy development as a result of all the parliamentary and court maneuvers that will be carried out in the near future.
On the other side, the European elections have less relevance from the viewpoint of their political effects in Spain, but will be taken as a thermometer in order to assess the support to the different parliamentary parties. Nevertheless, taking into account the results of the main state parties at the Basque and Catalan elections, they will not reflect their electoral possibilities at the national level. The participation in the European elections is noticeably lower than in other elections. The greater or lesser danger for the continuity of the current Government cannot be inferred from the result of the European elections.
The electoral cycle in Spring, and especially the European elections, will serve —in this case it actually does— to measure the consequences of the conflicts within the new social democracy. The results of the different forces in that space in the autonomic elections will be highly interesting in order to assess the possible evolution of the struggle between Podemos and Sumar — taking into consideration that none of them will directly participate in Catalonia. However, the result of the European elections —in which the vote as an expression of sympathy has a larger influence— will be more relevant, especially when the difficulties of the organizational structure of Sumar have been verified and some of its members and allies will run for other lists in these elections. In any case, regardless of whether the results favor one or another section, these electoral processes will confirm the end of cycle for the new social democracy, whose projects lack any difference to the PSOE’s. They are on their way to become a simple appendix of such party. Their main differences with the PSOE are based on issues like prostitution.
Specifically on this issue of prostitution, the proposal the PSOE put forward in mid-March is empty of meaning, intended only to please certain akin sections of feminism. It is known that there are no conditions for the adoption of the proposal excepting from the support of the PP, apart from the fact that there are no suitable means for the implementation of the measures announced, while the economic and social conditions causing the phenomenon of prostitution are not approached in any way.
On his part, Pedro Sánchez is attempting to consolidate his international prominence, surely because he is thinking about his own future. This has two sides. On one side, the recent tour in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar served to talk about not only the situation in Palestine but also business. In this sense, it is relevant to wonder why the announcement of the recognition of the Palestinian State will be in Summer and not right now, when the Government can take such decision in any moment.
On the other side, Sánchez and his Government are presenting themselves as a “social democratic resistance” within a series of consecutive electoral wins of liberal-conservative forces in Europe. Sánchez wants to present himself —taking advantage of this situation— as an exponent of a particular way of management that, as it shares the essential axes of the capitalist model of domination, presents the State as a discipliner of capital and social democracy as a guarantor of a fairer and more effective redistribution, partly thanks to the “tax justice”, promoting new mechanisms of taxation for big fortunes. Sánchez and those who tout this kind of arguments forget two essential issues: First, the State does not “discipline” capital, but it is the tool of capitalists to ensure their investments; second, “tax justice” is possible during certain economic situations, while “tax discipline” —generally paid by the working-class majority— prevails in others.
Also, as a means to stamp a profile against the PP and VOX, the issue of the laws on historic memory comes up again. Sánchez intends to claim them in order to put the PP as a hostage of VOX and, in the way, ease the revisionist stances on Francoism —amid a true struggle for the political center that he can carry out thanks to the left wing of the social democracy, totally submitted to his stances and within an important crisis. In this sense, it is true that the laws “on concord” being adopted by some autonomic governments like Castile and León, Valencia, or Aragón are real nonsense that equate the Republican period with Francoism and ignore the word “dictatorship” while they equate victims and executioners. But, at the same time, we should underscore the fact that the Law on Democratic Memory of the previous government of coalition, drafted from the Law on Historic Memory adopted during the first term of the Zapatero Government, was absolutely not enough, just a whitewash of the government after years of total state silence about disappeared people, deeply unworthy, as it presented the bourgeois democracy born from the Transition as the overcoming of all the prior evils while leaving the responsible of Francoist crimes untouched. Because of all the above mentioned, our approach should be the one put forward by some committees, like Castile and León’s, exposing the shortsightedness of the laws adopted by the social democracy while these autonomic laws mean several steps back in a process of flagrant historic revisionism, heading again towards the erase of the memory of our class.
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